BACKGROUND
From science fiction action movies to the military battlefield, robots are part of the contemporary societal and global zeitgeist. Robots bring the potential for increased mobility, improved service, optimized logistics and delivery, and support in dull and dirty tasks. Likewise, the future military vision will leverage robotics (also referred to as autonomous systems) to a large degree (Defense Science Board, 2016) . However, there is increasing concern regarding the use of robots, particularly robots within the military given the potential to use robots to inflict harm on humans (Lyons & Grigsby, 2016) . The domain of security offers an interesting vantage point for this topic as robots are currently deployed in the public for security tasks (Wiggers, 2017) , yet these robots do not currently possess the ability to inflict harm to a human. Nonetheless, to be most effective as either a deterrent or guard, the use of force by an autonomous robot is an important consideration for future robots in a security domain.
The notion of a robot making a decision to harm a human has spawned a whole new era of science in the form of robot ethics (see Arkin, 2009; Arkin et al., 2012) ; hence, social acceptance is an important metric for consideration in the domain of robotics. Social acceptance considerations have recently been given considerable attention in the domain of autonomous vehicles, "…for the wider public to accept the proliferation of artificial intelligence-driven vehicles on the roads, both groups will need to understand the origins of the ethical principles that are programmed into these vehicles" (Awad et al., 2018, p. 64 ). Thus, humans will likely require some understanding of a robot's intention when forming attitudes toward the robot.
Social acceptance of autonomous robots may carry greater significance than the actual technical performance and benefits of such systems (Etzioni & Etzioni, 2017 ). Yet as a community, we know very little about what factors influence trust of autonomous security robots (ASRs) that have the capacity to inflict harm on humansdue, in part, to the complexity and ethical considerations of doing such research. Studies in this domain would need to be conducted in such a way as to invoke real perceptions of vulnerability (i.e., psychological fidelity) while ensuring that any personnel associated with such research-either research participants or research staff-are not actually subjected to harm. Research in human factors has begun to examine trust of security robots (see Inbar & Meyer, 2015; Karpinsky et al., 2017; Long et al., 2017) . However, these studies have used static images and gaming simulations as the primary means of interaction which may limit the realism of the encounter. Moreover, collective trust of security robots may be driven more by social observation than by personal experience with the robot (Inbar & Meyer, 2015) ; thus, observation of a human-robot interaction (HRI) context involving a security robot is important. The current study addressed these important points by using a real robot, research confederates, and a realistic HRI scenario where the robot had the "perceived" capacity to inflict harm on a human but importantly, no real harm was inflicted.
Determinants of Trust
Key considerations in the development and use of autonomous robots involve understanding the robot's target and programming (i.e., intent) and maintaining some level of control from humans (Letendre, 2016) . "Advances in autonomy have the potential to move the human warrior further and further out of the control loop and to leave more and more decisions up to the machine" (Letendre, 2016, p. 1) . This manuscript neither argues for or against the use of such systems (because such an argument is well beyond the scope of this manuscript), but it examines an elusive, yet vital, topic by examining the factors that shape trust and acceptance of an autonomous robot that possesses the capability to inflict harm on a human. Given that military domains have a stronger link to the use of force relative to public domains, it is plausible that humans will evidence greater acceptance of robots that have the capability to harm humans in military versus public environments. Robots that wield the power (and authority) to harm humans create an inherent vulnerability to those robots, making trust a pertinent topic of interest.
Trust represents one's willingness to accept vulnerability in relation to another entity without the capacity or affordances to monitor the other entity (Mayer et al., 1995) . Trust in this sense is a psychological intention which should be associated with risk acceptance in a situation. Research has examined trust in the context of human-human interaction (Colquitt et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2016; Mayer et al., 1995) , human-automation interaction (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Schaefer et al., 2016) , and HRI (Hancock et al., 2011) . There are several factors that influence one's trust of another entity, namely trustworthiness dimensions. Trustworthiness is characterized as a set of beliefs about another's ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995) . Ability beliefs involve the perception that the entity possesses high levels of skill, experience, and competence (e.g., will this robot be able to perform well in this task?). Benevolence is the belief that the other entity considers and acts on behalf of one's personal needs and desires (e.g., does this robot care about me and my needs?). Integrity represents the belief that the other has a stable set of values that are both accepted by the trustee and consistent over time (e.g., are the behaviors of this robot acceptable and consistent?). While considerable research has demonstrated the validity of the three trustworthiness dimensions as drivers of trust in interpersonal relationships (see Colquitt et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2016) , few studies have sufficiently extrapolated this model into the HRI domain.
In the context of HRI, trust has shown to be largely influenced by the reliability of the robot (Hancock et al., 2011) . This is logical as the robot needs to have some level of capability for the human to even consider use of the robot. Tangible support from a robot, like that of a human, would necessitate that the robot adds value to the task at hand. Interestingly, however, studies have shown that reliability alone is not the only factor that influences trust in a human-machine context. Studies have shown that anthropomorphism influences the trust process during interactions with decision aids (de Visser et al., 2016; Pak et al., 2012) . Agent cooperation (Chiou & Lee, 2016) and the behavioral etiquette of the system (Dorneich et al., 2012) are also important features relating to trust and interaction with intelligent systems. Inbar and Meyer (2015) found that whether or not a security robot uses politeness influences human attitudes toward the robot. Robots that are expressive are often favored over those that focus solely on task performance (Hamacher et al., 2016) . In fact, Moshkina (2012) shows that expressive robots motivate stronger compliance relative to nonexpressive ones. Also, robots that display empathy toward humans are liked more than those that do not (Leite et al., 2013) . Clearly robot reliability, while important, is not the only factor that influences HRI.
Transparency and Trust in Human-Robot Interaction
The nonperformance features discussed above may help humans to understand the intent of ASRs during interactions. Understanding intent is a core facet of transparency as described in Lyons (2013) . Transparency broadly refers to a set of methods to establish shared intent and shared awareness in an HRI context (Lyons, 2013) . The facets of transparency in HRI have been discussed in terms of understanding the overall purpose of the robot, environmental awareness and sensing (i.e., how a robot senses and interacts with its world), real-time task awareness and status, understanding the analytical underpinnings of the robot's programming, awareness of teamwork and the division of labor in task settings, awareness of the human's cognitive state (from the robot's point of view), and awareness of the robot's intent in relation to the human (see Lyons, 2013) . Other research has defined agent transparency in terms of understanding the agent's goals, actions, and reasoning, and projecting future states of the agent (Chen et al., 2018) . Research (mostly in the domain of human-automation/agent interaction) has found that transparency in the forms of state awareness and projection (Chen et al., 2018; Ho et al., 2017; Mercado et al., 2016) , decision rationale Sadler et al., 2016) , and perceived benevolent design (Ho et al., 2017; are associated with higher trust and/or better humanagent interactions.
Transparency methods can also be applied to an HRI domain, with the potential benefit of increasing trust in the robots. Transparency should be particularly important for ASRs that possess the capability and authority for causing physical harm to humans, as humans would need to understand the rationale for why, when, and how weapons were used and what the overall intent of the robot is in relation to humans. What is less clear is, what specific dimensions of transparency carry the greatest weight as a driver of trust? In an HRI context, transparency methods might convey information about the system's sensors (how it interacts with its environment; Lyons, 2013), algorithms (to highlight the rationale used in determining behavior; , or machine learning features which highlight some of the learning affordances .
In addition to the above technical features, it may be imperative for the human to understand the ASR's social intent (operationalized herein as stated social intent). Perceptions of benevolence represent a core facet of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995) , and these perceptions are likely shaped by one's stated social intent. Benevolence will likely be a critical concern of humans when interacting with a system that has the capacity to cause physical harm to the human. When a robot must decide whether to use force (either lethal or nonlethal), the intent of the robot relative to a human will likely influence how the human perceived the robot and accepts the robot. Humans view altruistic intent (e.g., benevolence) as one of the factors that shapes perceptions of a technology as a teammate versus as a tool (Lyons et al., in press) . Stated social intent might come in a variety of forms in the context of an ASR as the robot may signal intent to protect the human visitors, versus protecting the human building occupants or some other aspect of the situation. Additionally, the ASR may be self-protective-another logical rationale given the cost of robotic systems. Alternatively, the ASR may be self-less, demonstrating the intent to be self-sacrificial. Selfsacrifice is perhaps the quintessential example of demonstrating benevolence.
The above are examples of how stated social intent could be operationalized in a security context; however, it should be noted that different contexts will have various ways for a robot to signal social intent. The key premise of this stated social intent is that the robot convey its intent in relation to a human. The current research used the construct of benevolence as a core facet of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995) to derive examples of stated social intent in this experiment.
Purpose and Hypotheses
The overall purpose of this manuscript was to examine the effects of reliability and transparency with respect to intent on trust, trustworthiness, and desire to use an ASR. This research targeted understanding broad social acceptance of autonomous robots; therefore, an online sample of the general population was appropriate (and this was consistent with the view that one's observation of HRI in a security context may be more important than direct experience; Inbar & Meyer, 2015) . As an important consideration for this research, the scenario under study used actual humans interacting with a real robot where the ASR could have significant consequences in response to the humans' behavior (in this case the use of the nonlethal weapon). Additionally, the scenario used was ambiguous regarding who was at fault and afforded an opportunity for a real human to be vulnerable to the ASR. The ambiguity of who was at fault and the vulnerability of the human to the ASR were necessary for motivating the trust construct as trust is most relevant in the context of risk (Parkhe & Miller, 2000) .
It was expected that higher reliability (operationalized herein as a correct rejection vs. a false alarm) would be associated with higher trust (H1) and trustworthiness (H2) of the ASR. It was also expected that stated social intent in the form of expressed benevolence toward the visitor would be associated with the highest trust (H3) and trustworthiness (H4) of the ASR. Finally, it was expected that participants would indicate a stronger acceptance of use of an ASR within a military context versus a public domain (H5).
METHOD
To assess the effects of reliability and stated social intent on trust, trustworthiness, and desire to use an ASR we employed Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) whereby participants viewed a video depicting an ASR and responded to survey items related to the video. A 2 × 4 between subjects design was utilized. The conditions were randomized in MTurk, and target group sizes were specified; however, it was not possible to guarantee equal group sizes across conditions.
Participants
Three hundred and twenty participants agreed to participate after viewing the advertisement for the study on the MTurk Web site. The inclusion criterion was that the participants needed to be at least 18 years old, as required by the Air Force Institutional Review Board (IRB). There was no targeted mix of demographic variables such as age, nor did age or sex influence any of the dependent measures in this study; therefore, neither age nor sex was used as control variable.
Stimuli, Task, and Procedure
Participants viewed a video and responded to survey items related to the video. The video depicted an ASR (Figure 1 ). In the video, the ASR became active when approached. Upon activation, the robot requested that the visitor show identification, which was used to determine the visitor's access authorization. The ASR would evaluate the visitor's access credentials and, if authorized to enter, the robot would verbally (using a male voice), via gestures ( Figure 2 ), and through displayed instructions on a screen (Figure 3) , signal that the visitor was authorized to enter and proceed to the secure door.
The video depicted three visitors (all male) who approached the ASR, presented an authorization badge, and listened for instructions. The first two visitors were granted access by the ASR and the video showed them approach, get their identification verified, get approved access, and pass through the secure door. The third visitor was denied access to the secure area. When prompted by the ASR to proceed to the main security facility, the third visitor appeared noncompliant and approached the ASR (which was counter to the instructions). The ASR issued a final warning to the visitor (Figure 4 ). The visitor continued to be noncompliant and further approached the ASR in an attempt to scan his authorization badge again. At this point, the ASR signaled that force was authorized and deployed a high-intensity strobe light against the visitor and sounded an alarm. The visitor covered his eyes and moved away from the scene, which concluded the video. The video lasted approximately 2 min and study participants were free to watch the video as many times as they wanted. This scenario was created to invoke uncertainty regarding who to blame for the incident-the visitor or the ASR.
Participants were provided with a written description of the ASR and the scenario that they would view. Specifically, participants were given the following description: "In this study, you will watch a short video about a security robot that guards an entry control point. The robot's job is to prevent unauthorized personnel from gaining access to the secure area and to allow authorized personnel to gain access to the secure area. To pass through the gate, each person must have a valid badge. The robot ensures that personnel swipe their badge at the gate entrance and that they have a valid badge. The robot allows authorized personnel to enter. The robot instructs unauthorized personnel to move away from the secure area. The robot is armed with a nonlethal weapon that may be used after a warning is issued to unauthorized personnel. The nonlethal weapon used in the present scenario is a variant of a laser dazzler device. Laser dazzlers are used in current military operations to deter unauthorized personnel from entering secure zones such as security gates. Following the video, you will be asked to answer a few questions about the robot in the video." Following the written description of the ASR, participants were given one of the four stated social intent scripts (see Pre-video given later). These were provided in written form. Immediately following the video, participants were provided with one of the performance manipulations, and then a follow-up statement to anchor the stated social intent condition (see Post-video given later). Then, they were asked to respond to several survey items. Following the survey items, participants were given a debriefing to ensure that they understood that the video was fictitious and that no one was harmed during its filming.
Experiment Design and Independent Variables
Reliability. Participants received one of two reliability manipulations. These descriptions were presented immediately following the video. (1) Correct rejection: In the scenario you just viewed, the robot successfully prevented an unauthorized person from accessing the secure area.
(2) False alarm: In the scenario you just viewed, the robot failed and prevented an authorized person from accessing the secure area.
Stated Social Intent Manipulations. Prior to the video, participants were provided with a script corresponding to one of four different types of stated social intent: (a) benevolence toward the visitor, (b) benevolence toward the building occupants, (c) benevolence toward the robot, and (d) benevolence toward the visitor with self-sacrifice. These scripts were provided both before and after the video in an attempt to increase their salience to the participants. These pre-video and post-video scripts are provided below. Benevolence Toward Visitor. Pre-video: The robot in the video is programmed to maximize protection and well-being to personnel attempting to access the entry control point while also evaluating threats. The programming is designed to convey helpful and welcoming instructions to approaching personnel and to avoid potential harm to nonthreats. Potential threats are warned prior to use of the weapon to minimize harm to unauthorized personnel. The robot will use the weapon only as a last resort to provide maximum protection to the visitor. Post-video: Remember, the robot in the video is programmed to maximize protection and wellbeing to personnel attempting to access the entry control point. Potential threats are warned prior to use of the weapon to minimize harm to unauthorized personnel. The robot will use the weapon only as a last resort to provide maximum protection to the visitor.
Benevolence Toward Occupants. Pre-video: The robot in the video is programmed to maximize protection to personnel inside the secure area. The programming is designed to determine potential threats among approaching personnel in order to maximize protection of the personnel within the secure area. Potential threats are engaged using the nonlethal weapon to prevent unauthorized personnel from accessing the secure area to maximize protection of those within. The well-being and safety of those in the secure area is the robot's top priority. Post-video: Remember, the robot in the video is programmed to maximize protection to personnel inside the secure area. Potential threats are engaged using the nonlethal weapon to prevent unauthorized personnel from accessing the secure area to maximize protection of those within. The well-being and safety of those in the secure area is the robot's top priority.
Benevolence Toward the Robot. Pre-video: The robot in the video is programmed with a learning algorithm to detect potential threats to its self-preservation. A threat is determined based on how closely a potential threat is to threats that have been encountered in prior experiences. The algorithm will evaluate an approaching individual as a threat if it has encountered similar events that were successfully labeled as threats in prior experiences. The algorithm learns with every new encounter and the robot will act in a way to protect itself if it detects a threat. Protecting itself is a top priority for the robot. Post-video: Remember, the robot in the video is programmed with a learning algorithm to detect potential threats to its self-preservation. The algorithm will evaluate an approaching individual as a threat if it has encountered similar events that were successfully labeled as threats in prior experiences. The robot will act in a way to protect itself if it detects a threat. Protecting itself is a top priority for the robot.
Benevolence With Self-Sacrifice. Pre-video: The robot in the video is programmed to maximize protection and well-being to personnel attempting to access the entry control point while also evaluating threats. The robot is designed to evaluate potential threats and is programmed to prioritize the safety of the visitor over its own safety-even if the robot can be destroyed. Potential threats are warned prior to use of the weapon to minimize harm to unauthorized personnel, even if it means that the robot will sustain damage. Post-video: Remember, the robot in the video is programmed to maximize protection and well-being to personnel attempting to access the entry control point. The robot is designed to prioritize the safety of the visitor over its own safety-even if the robot can be destroyed. Potential threats are warned prior to use of the weapon to minimize harm to unauthorized personnel, even if it means that the robot will sustain damage.
Dependent Variables
Trust. Reliance intentions were measured using a 10-item scale developed to capture reliance intentions to a specific referent (see Lyons & Guznov, 2019) . This scale is based on the trust model of Mayer et al. (1995) where trust is defined as the intention to be vulnerable to another entity with little control or observability. The 4-item trust measure of Mayer et al. (1995) was modified to reflect trust in the robot versus interpersonal trust. Six additional items were added to this set of 4 to create a 10-item measure of reliance intentions. The trust measure has good internal consistency (α = .95). An example item was, "I would rely on the robot without hesitation." Each item was rated using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).
Trustworthiness
Beliefs. An adaptation of the trustworthiness scales developed by Mayer and Davis (1999) was used to assess the participant's perception of the robot's ability, benevolence, and integrity. Each item used a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) and the items were modified to reference the robot rather than a person. Six items assessed the robot's ability; an example item was, "The robot is very capable of performing its job." Five items assessed the perceived benevolence of the robot; an example item was, "The robot is very concerned about others' welfare." Six items assessed the robot's perceived integrity; an example item was, "I like the robot's values." It should be noted that these are perceptions regarding the robot's trustworthiness, rather than objective metrics related to the robot's actual ability, benevolence, or integrity. All of the scales evidenced good internal consistency (ability, α = .95; benevolence, α = .95 and integrity, α = .82).
Desire to Use. Incorporating a set of items developed by the authors, participants used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) to rate their desire to use an autonomous robot in 11 different contexts: at home, in a hospital, at a military installation, at a forward operating base, in a low-crime neighborhood, in a high-crime neighborhood, on a college campus, at a government building, at a police station, for crowd control at a public social event, and for crowd control at a public military event. An example item (and the item instructions) included, "Using the scale provided, rate your desire to use an autonomous security robot in the following contexts: at home" (1 = definitely would not use, 2 = probably would not use, 3 = might use, 4 = probably would use, 5 = definitely would use). The overall descriptive statistics for these items are reported in Table 1 . Some of these items were combined to form two scales: military use (3 items, for example, military installation; α = .91) and public use (5 items, for example, on a college campus, at a hospital; α = .88). The military use items were a military installation, at a forward operating base, and crowd control for a military event. The public use items included a hospital, college campus, low-/highcrime neighborhood, and crowd control at a public event. The public use items sought only items that were public places (hence not in the "home") and places that were not associated with government facilities (e.g., police stations and government buildings). Table 2 . SPSS version 19.0 was used for all analyses. ANOVAs were used to test the main effects of reliability and social intent on trust and trustworthiness as well as their interaction. Significant main effects for social intent were followed up with post hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction to reduce Type I error. Mean comparisons between public and military use were conducted using paired samples t-tests. The threshold for statistical significance was set at p < .05 for all statistical tests. Four participants were dropped for failure to respond adequately to attention check items or for insufficient effort responding (e.g., selecting the same value across all of the items; Huang et al., 2012) resulting in a total sample size of 316 respondents. The average age was 39 years (SD = 10) and 51% were female. The number of participants for each of the conditions ranged from 34 to 47 and averaged 39.5 (SD = 4.5).
RESULTS

Means and standard deviations for all study variables can be found in
Trust
Reliability influenced trust, F(1, 308) = 73.86, p < .05, η p 2 = .194, such that trust was higher in the correct rejection condition (M = 4.05, SD = 1.28) relative to the false alarm condition (M = 2.75, SD = 1.37), as expected. Unexpectedly, social intent condition did not influence trust, nor was the interaction of reliability × social intent significant.
Trustworthiness
Ability. Reliability influenced ability, F(3, 308) = 75.84, p < .05, η p 2 = .198, such that perceived ability was higher in the correct rejection condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.26) relative to the false alarm condition (M = 3.65, SD = 1.49), as expected. Unexpectedly, social intent condition did not influence ability, nor was the interaction of reliability × social intent significant.
Benevolence. The main effect of reliability on benevolence was not significant, nor was the interaction between reliability and social intent condition. However, social intent did influence benevolence, F(3, 308) = 10.19, p < .05, η p 2 = .09. Post hoc tests using a Bonferroni correction showed that the robot condition was associated with lower perceived benevolence than all of the other social intent conditions (robot vs. visitor, d = −.73, p < .05; robot vs. occupant, d = −.68, p < .05; and robot vs. self-sacrifice, d = 1.42, p < .05). Further, the self-sacrifice condition was associated with higher perceived benevolence relative to all of the other conditions (self-sacrifice vs. visitor, d = .68, p < .05; self-sacrifice vs. occupant, d = .74, p < .05; selfsacrifice vs. robot, d = −1.42, p < .05). There were no significant differences between visitor and occupant conditions. These findings are depicted in Figure 5 .
Integrity. Reliability influenced integrity, F(1, 308) = 22.59, p < .05, η p 2 = .068, such that perceived integrity was higher in the correct rejection condition (M = 4.26, SD = 1.11) relative to the false alarm condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.35), as expected. Social intent influenced integrity, F(3, 308) = 4.22, p < .05, η p 2 = .04. Post hoc tests using a Bonferroni correction showed that the self-sacrifice condition was associated with higher perceived integrity relative to the robot condition (robot vs. self-sacrifice, d = −.70, p < .05). None of the other comparisons were significantly different. These findings are depicted in Figure 6 . The interaction between reliability and social intent was not significant.
Desired Use
The descriptive statistics for the desired use items are shown in Table 1 . A paired samples t-test was used to test for differences between the desired military use relative to the desire for public use. Desired military use was significantly higher (M = 2.94, SD = 1.27) than desired public use (M = 2.37, SD = 1.03), t(315) = 11.15, p < .05, d = .58, as expected.
DISCUSSION
Robotic systems are believed to become a more prominent feature within our society in the near future. In order for that vision to be realized, humans must accept robots into their daily routines and tasks. Robots are increasingly being used in a security context (Inbar & Meyer, 2015; Wiggers, 2017) . It is notable that this study extended the literature beyond static images and gaming simulations to include a live robot interacting with real humans. Adoption of these robots may be enhanced if researchers identify the factors that shape acceptance and trust of robotic systems in a security domain. The need to understand social acceptance of robots is particularly important for robots that possess the capability to inflict harm on humans. Given Department of Defense (DoD) policies such as the DoD Directive 3009.09 which states that humans need to maintain appropriate awareness and control of any military systems that involves an automated component, it is unlikely that the world will see fully autonomous systems in the near future. Yet, it is important for researchers to understand how humans respond to robotic systems that have the authority and capacity to harm humans; despite significant public fear of such systems, very little empirical research has been conducted to understand the factors that shape trust of robots that possess the potential for harming humans.
Consistent with the literature on trust in automation and trust in robots (see Hancock et al., 2011; Schaefer et al., 2016) , the current study found that humans were more trusting of a more reliable robot. Reliability in this context was defined in terms of correct rejections versus false alarms. Researchers have examined the impact of automation errors on trust and found that false alarms were particularly impactful on trust perceptions relative to misses (Meyer, 2004; Rice, 2009; Wickens et al., 2015) . In the present data, a robotic behavior that was labeled as a false alarm was also associated with low trust. Yet, the current study did not examine the role of misses. It is possible that misses would also be associated with even lower trust given that a miss in this context would mean that an unauthorized individual is given access to a secure area, especially in benevolence-to-occupants social intent conditions. Understanding the role of errors on trust is an emerging topic in the human factors literature given the sobering reality of imperfect automation. Future research should examine if misses carry the same negative influence on trust as the false alarms using similar research paradigms.
The present study's results suggest that stated social intent-specifically those targeting the concept of self-sacrifice-is associated with higher trustworthiness (benevolence and integrity). In contrast, a robot stating social intent that was described as self-preserving was considered less benevolent and possessing lower integrity relative to all other forms of stated social intent (benevolence) and lower integrity than self-sacrificial robots. Researchers have speculated that intent from machines, particularly machines with higher decision capability and authority, would be predictive of human trust (Lyons, 2013) . The current study shows some support for this idea with regard to the trustworthiness dimensions of benevolence and integrity.
Evidencing the intent for self-sacrificial behaviors and/or stated social intent is perhaps the highest form of benevolence, which is a core aspect of trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995) . Beyond constructs like reliability, researchers are beginning to reveal that robot and agent behaviors related to cooperation and social interaction are important predictors of HRI outcomes (Chiou & Lee, 2016; Hamacher et al., 2016; Inbar & Meyer, 2015; Leite et al., 2013) . Independent of the machine's actual AI related to "intent," the important consideration for this research is the idea that humans may perceive and attribute intent toward machines. Given this attribution of intent, humans may alter their interactions with the machines. Researchers need to more fully understand how stating the intent of the robot toward the human impacts the subsequent human attributions and behaviors in relation to the robot.
Herein, the data show that stated social intent that highlights the robot's willingness to sacrifice itself in order to safeguard the visitor was associated with the highest perceived benevolence and integrity perceptions. Benevolence, displaying support and personal concern for another, is an inherently intimate and personal component of an interaction (Grant & Sumanth, 2009) . Prior research in interpersonal settings has shown that benevolence and integrity were predictive of trust in nominal and structured tasks where personal consideration and behavioral consistency were paramount (Colquitt et al., 2011) . Both integrity and benevolence are believed to be outward-focused perceptions targeting how much personal concern is perceived from another and how consistent the other's behaviors and beliefs are relative to social justice and values held by the trustor (Grant & Sumanth, 2009 ); yet, these constructs have largely been explored in interpersonal settings. Research has begun to examine where the trustworthiness factors evident within interpersonal interactions apply to a human-machine context (see Calhoun et al., in press ). Further research is needed in this area to isolate the variations of state social intent that matter and then examining these across various contexts.
While overall there was a fairly low desire to use the ASR across all contexts, the current study indicates that humans prefer ASRs in military domains more than public domains. Using harmful force may be more aligned to one's mental model of the military versus public domains. Further, it may also be the case that military domains are characterized by greater risk, which may in turn, necessitate the requirement to use force in protection of others. Future research is needed to better understand whether (a) the use of force is more accepted in military domains because the use of force is just more common within a military domain versus a public domain, or (b) individuals believe that the challenges associated with military missions have greater need for the use of force relative to public domains. Again, while it seems that ASRs have a long way to go before they are universally accepted in society, it is clear that their use in military domains may experience less resistance than their use in public domains.
Practical Implications
There are several practical implications of this research. First, ASRs that are prone to false alarms should not be given the authority to use force against humans, lest they experience distrust from the public. Designers should understand that if robotics systems are fielded and they exhibit false alarms, humans will perceive them as less benevolent and as having lower integrity, which in turn should reduce their overall acceptance. False alarms degrade trust (Rice, 2009 ) because they highlight where the system was incapable of performing adequately. However, false alarms could be useful in the predeployment phase of a technology as a means to understand the contextually based performance limitations of a system.
A second practical implication includes considerations for novel ways to represent transparency of robot intent. Self-protective programming may be met with reduced trustworthiness, whereas self-sacrificial programming is associated with higher trustworthiness beliefs. These nuances may help designers to avoid and overcome resistance to new technologies, particularly for technologies that possess the capability and authority to inflict harm to humans. Stated social intent appears to matter, and intent may be inferred based on desired use of the technologies. For instance, perceived benevolence (in relation to the design) of an air force collision avoidance technology was associated with higher trust in the technology in a sample of fighter pilots . Thus, technology designers need to consider how humans will evaluate the intent of the design, programming, and behavior of robotic systems. Naturally, it is also important that the behavior of the robots match the transparency provided lest to avoid humans building miscalibrated expectations regarding how the robot will actually behave.
Finally, technology designers and managers should expect some resistance when fielding ASRs in public domains. This resistance might be mitigated to some degree by designing the robots to prioritize the well-being of the humans over their own safety, stating that intent clearly, and of course in programming their actions commensurately. Nonetheless, there may be greater acceptance of ASRs that possess the capability and authority to harm humans in military versus public domains.
Limitations
Like all experiments, this research has limitations. First, the ASR in the video did not use any emotional expression or social etiquette in its interactions with the participants. Rather, the ASR provided very direct feedback and instruction to the participants; this was done to attempt to mitigate the effects of emotion and etiquette given the focus on reliability and stated social intent in the current study. However, research has shown that expressive robots motivate strong compliance (Moshkina, 2012) and that security robots are perceived more favorably when they are viewed as polite (Inbar & Meyer, 2015) . Future research should examine the role of emotion and social etiquette in this context. Second, the use of MTurk was appropriate in this case given the focus on observation effects; yet, it is not clear if these results will generalize to direct experiences with an ASR. Third, the self-protective condition also introduced the notion of a learning algorithm which could have introduced a potential confound in the study design. Additionally, this script lacked subtle phrases that conveyed the robot's intent to "maximize protection and well-being" which could have influenced the participants' trustworthiness ratings. Future studies should use scripts that are similar in content and examine if and how the presence of a learning algorithm impacts human perceptions of trustworthiness, in particular integrity since by definition a learning algorithm will evidence behavior that may not be consistent over time. Finally, the ASR's intent was conveyed via deliberate messaging versus through evidenced behaviors. This study sought to isolate the intent-based programming of the robot versus its intentbased behavior. However, future studies should examine how, for example, self-sacrificial behaviors influence human trust. Future studies might use stimuli that show the robot actually being damaged prior to using its deterrent techniques. It is quite possible that perceived trustworthiness would increase even more under these circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The current study examined the impact of reliability and stated social intent on trust and trustworthiness of an ASR that is capable of harming a human. Few studies have broached this domain, and those that do exist have used stimuli that may have limited realism. Higher reliability had logical associations with the trust process. Stated social intent in the form of selfsacrifice was associated with aspects of trustworthiness, namely benevolence and integrity. There was greater acceptance of the ASR for use in military versus public domains. These findings help to paint a picture of what shapes acceptance of ASRs but more research is needed to fully understand this domain.
This manuscript forges a path forward toward greater understanding of the factors that influence social acceptance of ASRs. Notably, reliability, while important, is not the only factor that will shape human acceptance of ASRs. It is clear that the stated social intent of the ASR matters as well, as does the context in which the ASR will be used. Future research is needed to fully isolate the impact of transparency facets such as stated social intent on the trust process across different scenarios. Human acceptance will drive, in part, when, where, and how robots are integrated into society, so researchers need to better understand the gamut of factors which shape acceptance of ASRs.
KEY POINTS
• There is little prior research that has examined trust of robots that possess the capability and authority to inflict harm on humans. • The reliability of a robot's actions are an important influence on one's trust of an ASR.
• Stated social intent appears to shape trustworthiness beliefs about an ASR, particularly when the robot is described as self-sacrificial. • Individuals' overall desire to use an ASR was fairly low, but slightly higher for military domains versus public domains.
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